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INTRODUCTION

HESE are interesting times in environmental law, both in Texas
and nationally. Federal and state laws are undergoing challenge,
and the U.S. Supreme Court has been very active in the environmental context. The federal circuit courts and district courts as well as
state courts are addressing environmental statutory and common-law issues at a regular clip. During the Survey period, Texas courts have been
quite active, and several significant cases have been handed down or at
least reflect developing issues that are being addressed in courts across
the country.
The United States Supreme Court has actively been involved in determining when a private party may bring cost-recovery actions for voluntarily cleaning up sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").1 Recently, the Court
has decided to hear a closely watched environmental case that may have
significant financial implications for both the federal government and private industry. The case, United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,2 is the
second of a duo of cases that consider whether companies can recover
costs incurred to cleanup contaminated sites voluntarily under Section
107 of the Act-the general cost-recovery provision. 3 In the first of the
two cases, Cooper Industries,Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,4 the Court ruled
that parties could not recover such voluntary costs from other liable parties, including the government, under Section 113 of CERCLA-the contribution section of the federal Superfund cleanup statute, which allows
one private party to sue another liable party, including governmental
bodies.
While voluntary cleanup has been growing, promoted by industry and
government alike, the federal government has argued in its briefs to re1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2007).
2. AtI. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 75
U.S.C.W. 3384 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2007) (No. 07-562).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2007).
4. 543 U.S. 157, 160 (2004), discussing 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2004).
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strict such volunteers' ability to recover costs from other liable parties,
primarily because the government itself is often a liable party.
As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court recently ruled
that private cost-recovery actions are permissible under Section 107 of
5
CERCLA.
Another issue that Texas courts adjudicated is the extent of jurisdiction
of the federal Clean Water Act. The United States Supreme Court and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals have been active in this area over the
last several years. Texas courts have been faced with applying Supreme
Court and Fifth Circuit precedent during the Survey Period.
One other matter of particular interest involves the application of as-is
provisions in real estate contracts and the extent of the relief that a buyer
may receive. The Texas Supreme Court handed down an important decision in an attempt to demarcate the boundaries of the protections that
these as-is provisions provide, which real estate and environmental lawyers should spend some time studying.
A variety of other important and interesting issues are addressed in this
year's Article. The precedent discussed below may have significant impact on parties facing similar environmental challenges.
II.

EFFECT OF "AS-IS" CONTRACTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY FOLLOWING A REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTION

Commercial real estate transactions generally occur in the context of a
contract with an as-is clause. Such clauses attempt to avoid any seller
warranties for defects in the property. Since real estate sales put the
buyer at risk of acquiring not only land, but also liability for any contamination or pollution thereon, as-is clauses present questions of environmental liability of both the seller and the buyer and whether the buyer
may return to the seller if environmental surprises spring up in the days,
months, or even years after the sale. This latent environmental risk often
arises as a primary consideration in real estate transactions, and, if not
discovered at the time of sale, often results in litigation over the contract's meaning and the extent to which the seller is relieved from environmental liability for the property.
The Texas Supreme Court in prior cases and during the Survey period
addressed fraud claims of dissatisfied buyers. Another area of perhaps
more importance is statutory environmental liability. An open question
not discussed is whether as-is clauses provide sellers any relief from statutory environmental liability.
As-is clauses are usually contained in a longer section of the purchase
contract and often also contain so-called "waiver-of-reliance clauses,"
which are designed to address an element of fraud or misrepresentation,
5. See United States v. Atil. Reseach Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007).
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namely that the buyer relied on any representation or, in some cases, the
failure of the seller to disclose known material information.
Of course, commercial real estate transactions almost always involve at
least some investigation of the potential environmental risks associated
with the property in the form of Phase I or Phase II Environmental Site
Assessments. The typical real estate contract contains a due diligence
period during which the potential buyer may investigate the property and
may conduct a Phase I assessment. If the environmental consultant who
performs the Phase I recommends a Phase II, then he will also conduct
intrusive investigation, and may include soil and groundwater testing.
The contract often states that the buyer must conduct this investigation
and determine whether he wants to proceed with the transaction or not.
If he chooses to proceed, then the contract often describes this as evidence that the client is satisfied that there are no defects in the property-environmental or otherwise.
Real estate contracts are often drafted with these types of "boilerplate" provisions. Unfortunately, the standard approach for drafting a
particular real estate contract and the environmental assessment that is
conducted may not always be in best interest of the buyer. With respect
to the contract language, in particular, the buyer may not want to accept
that the seller may fail to disclose or misrepresent the property's environmental conditions.
The Texas Supreme Court provided an illustration of this during the
Survey period and reviewed Texas case law on applying these provisions.
In Warehouse Associates Corporate Centre II, Inc. v. Celotex Corp.,6 the
plaintiff-buyer learned the hard way that a standard as-is contract may
not provide the kind of protection from fraud that, at least from the
buyer's perspective, should be afforded by contract or would otherwise
be provided by common law. The case further demonstrates that such
contracts arguably attempt to inappropriately afford sellers actual or perceived cover for what may be considered fraudulent behavior. In Warehouse Associates, Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District
preserved protections for buyers, but only in limited circumstances.
The case involved a buyer who purchased a property where an asphaltshingle manufacturing plant had previously operated-where asbestos
was used and buried in the ground. The contract provided that the property would be sold on a "where is, as is" basis, "with all faults."'7 It imposed no obligation on the seller to provide documents or records
relating to the property's condition but allowed the plaintiff sixty days to
inspect the property and terminate the contract for any reason based on
its sole discretion within that period. If the buyer proceeded to close, the
buyer would accept the property and assume all liability for owning, using, or possessing the property, including any liability imposed by local,
6. 192 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
7. Id. at 228.
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state, or federal environmental laws or regulations. 8
The seller produced part of an environmental report to the buyer that
discussed asbestos in the buildings but did not discuss asbestos in the soil
or its use in the manufacturing process. The part that discussed asbestos
use in the manufacturing process was not disclosed to the buyer. Moreover, during the inspection period, a contractor excavating soil on the
property discovered what appeared to be raw, friable asbestos buried below the surface. The contractor's employee contacted the director of environmental affairs for the seller and was told to backfill that area and not
to perform any other excavation in the area. The buyer's environmental
consultant hired to conduct a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment did
not ask the director of environmental affairs about asbestos, and no mention of the buried asbestos was made. When asked about the materials
used in the manufacturing process, asbestos was not mentioned. The consultant also conducted a Phase II assessment and collected soil samples
from the property, but did not perform any asbestos testing. 9
After the closing, the buyer hired a contractor to remove slabs from the
property, and, in doing so, the buried asbestos was discovered. Extensive
sampling determined that asbestos contamination was widespread, reaching thirteen feet below the surface. As a result, the buyer filed suit under
theories of common-law fraud; negligent misrepresentation; statutory
fraud under Section 27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code,
seeking rescission of the contract; punitive damages; and attorneys' fees.
The seller counterclaimed, and both parties filed motions for summary
judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment against the buyer as to its
claims and granted the buyer's summary judgment as to the seller's
claims, except for attorneys' fees, for which it awarded two-million dollars for fees and various costs. The buyer appealed the summary judgment and dismissal of its claims.
The court of appeals considered two Texas Supreme Court decisions,
Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Jefferson Associates, Limited10 and Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Swanson," in determining how to apply the as-is and waiver-of-reliance language in real
estate contracts in order to exclude inducement by fraud and activities of
the seller that impaired, obstructed, or interfered with buyer's inspection
of the property. The court of appeals concluded that the Prudentialexception survives the later Schlumberger Supreme Court opinion. 12
The Prudentialand Schlumberger courts raise two competing concerns:
on the one hand, the interest in allowing parties to enter into agreements
8. Id. at 227-28.

9. Id.
10. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
11. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997).
12. Warehouse Assocs., 192 S.W.3d at 230-31.
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that finally resolve all issues between them and, on the other hand,
preventing fraud to enter into an agreement waiving all claims.
The Prudential case set out two exceptions to the as-is and waiver-ofreliance language in contracts. The first is when the seller fraudulently
misrepresents or conceals information that induces the seller to enter into
the contract. 13 The second exception is when the facts show that the
seller impairs, obstructs, or interferes with the buyer's inspection of the
14
property.
A.

INDUCEMENT BY FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION OR
CONCEALMENT OF INFORMATION

The defendant in Warehouse Associates argued that even if these facts
exist, the as-is and waiver-of-reliance language can be enforced. 15 The
defendant relied on the Court's decision in Schlumberger, where the
Texas Supreme Court avoided the commitment-of-fraud view. 16 However, the supreme court concluded that the facts of the particular case
warranted not voiding a release of liability.17 In that case, the issue involved a settlement of the disputed value of an asset or commercial project. Because the waiver of reliance was directed at the dispute over
value, the court upheld the waiver as a matter of law and would not permit the seller's claim of fraud. 18
The court of appeals in Warehouse Associates did not agree with the
defendant that the Schlumberger case held that waiver-of-reliance provisions voided any claim that the seller fraudulently induced a buyer to
enter a sales contract. Rather, the court of appeals pointed out that the
Schlumberger case simply resolved apparent divisions in prior cases and
established the rule of law that it would refuse to enforce fraudulently
induced "waiver of reliance provisions." 19 This was considered to be consistent with "the great weight of authority, the Restatement of Contracts,
'20
and the views of eminent legal scholars.
The court of appeals also noted that Prudentialrecognized other situations in which the as-is or waiver-of-reliance provisions would not apply
based on the totality of the circumstances and several factors identified
by the Supreme Court. 21 The first was whether the sophistication of the
parties was in question or if one or more parties were not represented by
counsel. 22 The second was whether the contract arose in an arms-length
13. Id. at 230 (citing Prudential,896 S.W.2d at 160-62).
14. Id.

15. Id. at 231.
16. Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 178-79.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 179-80.
19. Warehouse Assocs., 192 S.W.3d at 231 (citing Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 178-79
(discussing Dallas Farm Mach. Co. v. Reaves, 307 S.W.2d 233, 234-41 (1957)).
20. Id. at 231-32 (citing Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 179).
21. Id. at 231 n.4 (citing Prudential,896 S.W.2d at 162).
22. Prudential,896 S.W.2d at 162.
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transaction. 23 Third, relative bargaining power and whether the contract
was freely negotiated were identified as a significant issues. 24 Finally, a
factor that was considered, which is of importance to practicing attorneys,
is whether the as-is or waiver-of-reliance provision rose to the level of an
important feature of the negotiations, or whether it was simply part of the
boilerplate in the form real estate contract.2 5 This latter issue is important, since most real estate attorneys or their clients maintain forms that
are used in most of their transactions. Showing which provisions were
actively discussed and which were not may be important in some cases.
In Warehouse Associates, the defendant attempted to turn these factors
against the plaintiff and argued that, because the buyer was represented
by counsel in an arms-length transaction, the waiver-of-reliance provision
should be enforced and the fraudulent-inducement exception should not
be applied. 26 The court of appeals rejected this position. 2 7 The court
noted that the jury found that the seller had withheld material information and fraudulently induced the buyer to enter the contract. Not sur28
prisingly, the court of appeals would not allow this fraud to go forward.
It must be kept in mind that the Schlumberger case involved a claim over
the asset's value, and this is what the waiver-of-reliance provision was
designed to address in terms of a settlement of the buyer's claim. This is
different from a real estate transaction because, although the value of the
asset, the property, and perhaps building or structures thereon are at issue, the buyer is at a disadvantage by not knowing what the seller may
know that is not readily discoverable by observation or environmental
assessment. Any claim by the buyer against the seller would arise after
the sale.
One issue that arose in Warehouse Associates was whether the plaintiff
buyer should have known of the buried asbestos. The court of appeals
ruled that the defendant seller concealed information and that it was not
clear that a buyer should have known asbestos had been used at the former manufacturing plant. 29 The court of appeals also rejected the argument that the plaintiff was charged with all information in the public
30
record.
Finally, the court of appeals did not adopt the defendant's argument
that the buyer's performance of it's own inspection of the property for
environmental conditions negated application of the fraudulent-induce31
ment exception.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Warehouse Assocs., 192 S.W.3d at 234 n.7.
Id.
Id. at 233-34.
See id. at 239.
See id. at 239 n.9.
Id. at 244-45.
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IMPAIRMENT OF INSPECTION

In Warehouse Associates, the court of appeals did not approve the impairment-of-inspection exception to the as-is and waiver-of-reliance provisions. 32 As a first step in applying this exception, the court of appeals
stated that it analyzes the "impairment-of-inspection exception separately
from the fraudulent-inducement exception."' 33 The court of appeals ruled
that the property was open for physical inspection and testing. The failure to provide information does not meet the exception, only conduct
that impairs, obstructs, or interferes "with the buyer's exercise of its conto carefully view, observe, and physically examine the proptractual right
'34
erty does."
The court's rationale is important. The opinion supports the ability of
sophisticated parties to enter into contracts in which the seller's statements cannot be relied upon so that the exception does not swallow the
rule of permitting as-is transactions. In particular, the court of appeals
noted that the parties were sophisticated and represented by counsel in
''an arm's length commercial transaction in a way that allocated the risk
of discovering adverse property conditions entirely to the buyer, and the
parties place the burden of inspecting the property for such conditions
entirely on the buyer. '35 Thus, the court appeared to leave the issue36of
concealment of information to the fraudulent-inducement exception.
III.
A. A

COST-RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA

PLAINTIFF IN A PRIVATE
UNDER SECTION

113

CERCLA

COST-RECOVERY ACTION

MAY ONLY RECOVER EACH

DEFENDANT'S PROPORTIONATE

SHARE OF LIABILITY

In a case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit in Elementis Chromium

L.P. v. Coastal States Petroleum Co. 37 held that liability in CERCLA contribution actions is several only, not joint and several.3 8 Although the
issue of whether or not liability in a CERCLA § 113(f) contribution action is joint and several was one of first impression in the Fifth Circuit
noted that the "overwhelming majority of [the] sister Circuits have concluded that liability is merely several under § 113(f)." ' 39 The Fifth Circuit
further reasoned that because "[t]he plain language of § 113(f) directs the
courts to 'allocate response costs among liable parties' in an equitable
manner," one liable party can recover only the proportionate share from
32. Id. at 244.
33. Id. at 241.
34. Id.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 241.
See id.
450 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 613.
Id. at 612.
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each of the other liable parties in a contribution action. 40 Accordingly,
the Fifth Circuit held that imposing joint and several liability on the defendants was improper. 4 1 Because the district court had not provided any
division of liability between the defendants, the Fifth Circuit remanded
42
the case to the district court for that determination.
The plaintiff in Elementis owned a manufacturing plant in Corpus
Christi (the "Elementis Site") that was contaminated with hydrocarbons
from operations on an adjacent property owned by El Paso Merchant
Energy-Petroleum Co. ("El Paso") and from operations on another adjacent property formerly owned by Amerada Hess Corp. ("Hess") but purchased by Magellan Terminals Holdings L.P. ("Magellan"). Plaintiff sued
El Paso for costs that it incurred cleaning up the Elementis Site, and El
Paso ultimately settled its case. El Paso then brought a third-party action
under CERCLA § 113(f) 43 against Hess and Magellan seeking contribution for response costs at the Elementis site. The district court found that
El Paso was 89.95% responsible and that Magellan and Hess were
10.05% responsible. The district court treated Magellan and Hess as a
collective entity for allocating responsibility and imposed joint and sev44
eral liability.
The Fifth Circuit considered El Paso's challenge to the district court's
allocation of only 10.05% of future response costs to Hess and Magellan.
Because allocation is a question of fact, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the
district court's determination for clear error. 45 The Fifth Circuit did not
find "evidence sufficient to produce the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed," so it affirmed the district court's alloca46
tion of future response.
B.

ABILITY OF PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS TO BRING COST-RECOVERY

ACTIONS UNDER SECTION

107

OF

CERCLA

Although the availability of cost recovery or contribution was not at
issue in Elementis, the Fifth Circuit stated that "when one liable party
sues another liable party under CERCLA, the action is not a cost recovery action under § 107(a) .... ,,47 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, however, relied on this dicta to make its
decision in Columbus McKinnon Corp. v. Gaffey. 48 The plaintiffs owned
and operated real property allegedly contaminated by former owners and
operators of the property. The plaintiffs purchased the property in 1997
but discovered the contamination in 2000. The plaintiffs filed suit in 2006
40.

Id. at 613.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
Elementis, 450 F.3d at 609.
See id. at 609-10.
Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 613.
No. H-06-1125, 2006 WL 2382463 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
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against certain of these former owners and operators, asserting claims for
response costs under CERCLA § 107 and the Texas Solid Waste Disposal
49
Act. The plaintiffs also asserted fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
With respect to the CERCLA § 107 claim, the defendants moved to
dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs are "potentially responsible parties"
("PRPs") and PRPs are not entitled to pursue claims under CERCLA
§ 107.50 The district court pointed out that, before the 2004 United States
Supreme Court decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services,
Inc.,51 the law was well established that PRPs do not have a viable claim
under CERCLA § 107.52 The Supreme Court declined to address the issue in Aviall, and, since that decision, "the law regarding whether a PRP
can maintain a CERCLA § 107(a) claim has become less settled." 53 The
district court noted the split among the federal circuit courts and stated
that the Fifth Circuit in Elementis had "indicated that it would not allow a
§ 107(a) claim by a PRP."' 54 Based on the clear pre-Aviall authority, the
Supreme Court's refusal in Aviall to decide the issue contrary to that authority, and the Fifth Circuit dicta in Elementis, the district court in Columbus concluded that a PRP does not have a viable claim for cost
55
recovery under CERCLA § 107(a).
As this Article was going to press, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that PRP's may bring cost recovery actions under § 107(a). 56 Thus,
the holding of the case has been negated.
With respect to the remaining Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act, fraud,
and fiduciary claims, the district court analyzed whether the claims were
time barred. The district court noted that each of the claims was subject
to a four-year statute of limitations. 57 The plaintiffs argued that although
they purchased the property in 1997, they did not discover the contamination until 2000, and thus, their claims were not time-barred because of the
discovery rule and because plaintiffs did not discover the full extent of
the contamination in 2000.58 The district court pointed out, however, that
the discovery rule is not an inquiry into whether the plaintiffs knew the
full extent of their damages. 59 The district court reasoned that, if the discovery rule is applicable, it delayed accrual of plaintiffs' state-law claims
only until 2000, when the plaintiffs discovered that their property was
49. Id. at *1-2.
50. Id. at *3.
51. 543 U.S. 157 (2004). For a discussion of the Aviall decision and subsequent cases,
see generally Scott D. Deatherage et al., Environmental Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 1279, 127983 (2006).
52. Columbus, 2006 WL 2382463, at *3.
53.

Id.

54. Id. at *4.
55. Columbus, 2006 WL 2382463, at *3-4; Contra Vine Street LLC v. Keeling, 362 F.
Supp. 2d 754, 763-64 (E.D. Tex. 2005).

56.
57.
58.
59.

United States v. Atd. Research Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007).
Columbus, 2006 WL 2382463, at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
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contaminated. 60 Accordingly, the four-year statute of limitations had run
the dison the plaintiffs' claims before they brought suit in 2006.61 Thus,
62

trict court granted the motion to dismiss the state-law claims.
In the remand of the case that upset settled legal precedent on CERCLA contribution, Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, LLC,63 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas considered whether PRPs can bring a cost-recovery or contribution action
under CERCLA § 107(a) or federal common law.
The district court first considered whether PRPs have an explicit right
to cost recovery under CERCLA § 107(a). The district court noted that a
party that resolves its CERCLA liability in an approved settlement receives protection from contribution claims under CERCLA § 113(f)( 2).
The district court reasoned that allowing PRPs to bring a cost-recovery
action under CERCLA § 107 would render §113(f)( 2) superfluous or, at
least, insignificant because non-settling PRPs could file suit against settling parties, and construing a statute to read out a provision violates a
cardinal principle of statutory construction. 64 Accordingly, the district
court held that PRPs6 5do not have an express right to cost recovery under
CERCLA § 107(a).
The district court then considered whether PRPs have an implied right
of contribution under CERCLA § 107(a) or federal common law. 66 The
district court first noted that dicta from the United States Supreme Court
decision in Aviall suggested that such an implied right likely does not
exist. 67 Further, the Court reasoned that, because Congress expressly

provided for contribution via CERCLA § 113, courts should not read additional remedies into CERLCA or imply them under federal common
law. 68 Accordingly, no right of contribution was seen to exist under

CERCLA § 107(a) or federal common law. 6 9 As stated above, the
United States Supreme Court has rejected this view, and held that a PRP
may bring a claim under section 107(a) to recover loss for rendering sites.
C.

PLEADING SUFFICIENT FACTS TO MAINTAIN A

CERCLA

COST-RECOVERY CLAIM

In General Cable Industries, Inc. v. Zurn Pex, Inc.,70 another case in60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id.
63. No. 3:97-CV-1926-D, 2006 WL 2263305 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2006). For the facts of
the Aviall case and analysis of the United States Supreme Court decision in Aviall, see the
Environmental Law Survey article in Volume 59 of the SMU Law Review. Deatherage
supra note 51, at 1279-83.
64. Aviall, 2006 WL 2263305, at *7.

65. Id. at *8.
66. Id. at *9.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *10.
70. No. 4:05-CV-428, 2006 WL 2827168 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2006).
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volving a CERCLA cost-recovery claim, the issue was whether the plaintiff had adequately pled sufficient facts to support its CERCLA claim.
The claimant owned property allegedly contaminated by a release of trichloroethylene ("TCE") from an adjacent property. Before the suit, one
of the defendants entered the adjacent site into the Texas Voluntary
Cleanup Program and installed ten groundwater monitoring wells and
conducted multiple rounds of groundwater sampling. The plaintiff subsequently sought damages from a number of the defendants asserting a variety of claims, including a CERCLA cost-recovery claim. The
defendants moved to dismiss the CERCLA claim, arguing that the plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to support a cause of action under
71
CERCLA.
The district court ruled that, in order to establish a case of liability in a
CERCLA cost-recovery case, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that a
release or threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur response
costs. 72 Defendants argued that plaintiff failed to adequately allege that
it had incurred response costs. 73 The district court pointed out that the
plaintiff alleged that it "incurred costs to investigate and monitor the contamination of its Property," and that it "has expended response costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan... including costs to monitor,
assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment. '74 With only these allegations "[t]he Plaintiff failed to allege what response costs it had incurred in containing the
release of TCE. '' 75 On the other hand, the district court held that the
76
plaintiff pled with specificity the response actions taken by defendants.
Because the plaintiff failed to allege a similar factual basis for its alleged
response costs, the district court considered plaintiff's allegations to be
conclusory. 77 The district court reasoned that, "when a complaint omits
facts that, if they existed, would clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to
assume that those facts do not exist."78 The district court, therefore, held
that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege that it incurred response costs
consistent with the National Contingency Plan, and, accordingly, the
79
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
D.

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER

CERCLA

The District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued two opinions on CERCLA issues in a single case involving contamination of a
71. Id. at *14.
72. Id. at *4.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *5.
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
79. Id. But see City of Waco v. Schouten, 385 F. Supp. 2d 595, 602-03 (W.D. Tex.

2005).
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large tin smelter site; one addressing successor liability,8 0 and the other
addressing arranger liability and the useful-product defense.8 ' In both
cases, a number of parties and the United States paid for remediation of
the site and some of those parties sought contribution from others, in(together the
cluding Oxyde Chemicals, B.V., Oxyde Chemicals, Inc.
82
"Oxyde Defendants"), and Bayer USA, Inc. ("Bayer").
The case involving successor liability arose from a motion for summary
judgment by the Oxyde Defendants. 3 The plaintiffs claimed that the Oxyde Defendants were liable as successors in interest to a Netherlands corporation, Oxyde Maatschappij voor Ertsen en Matalen, B.V. ("OMEM"),
which delivered contaminated tin residue to the Tex Tin site as part of its
metals and ores trading division. In 1985, OMEM sold its chemical divi84
sion, but not its metals and ores division, to Oxyde Chemicals, B.V.
The plaintiff and the defendants argued different tests for successor
liability. The Oxyde defendants proffered the general common-law rule
for successor liability that provides that an acquiring corporation is not
liable unless one of four exceptions is met: 1) the purchaser assumes liability, 2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger, 3) the
transaction is fraudulent or intended to provide an escape from liability,
or 4) the purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the selling
company.8 5 The plaintiff attempted to apply the "continuity of enterprise" or "substantial continuity" test that is based on a number of factors
including retention of the same employees, retention of the same supervisory personnel, retention of the same production facilities in the same
physical location, production of the same product, retention of the same
name, continuity of assets, continuity of general business operations, and
whether the successor holds itself out as the continuation of a previous
86
enterprise.
In considering the two approaches, the district court observed that the
continuity of enterprise theory had recently been rejected because it was
not part of general federal common law, while the common-law rule was
"consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Bestfoods, which applied the general common law to the question of parent/subsidiary liability under CERCLA. 8 7T Accordingly, the district court believed the
common-law approach to be more prudent and consistent with Supreme
Court precedent.8 8 Nevertheless, because the district court did not find
any controlling authority from the United States Supreme Court or the
80. Tex Tin Corp. v. United States, Nos. G-96-247, G-96-272, 2006 WL 1118587, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2006).
81. Tex Tin Corp. v. United States, Nos. G-96-247, G-96-272, 2006 WL 2546395, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2006).
82. Id.
83. Tex Tin Corp., 2006 WL 1118587, at *1.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55, 61-64 (1998)).
88. Tex. Tin Corp., 2006 WL 1118587, at *4.
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Fifth Circuit, it analyzed the facts under both tests.89
Under the general common-law approach, the district court determined that the Oxyde Defendants were not the successor to OMEM. 90
The Oxyde Defendants did not assume liability, either expressly or indirectly, for the metals and ores trading business of OMEM. Further, the
transaction between OMEM and Oxyde Chemicals, B.V. was not a de
facto merger or consolidation because OMEM sold the chemicals division
to an unrelated entity with different shareholders; OMEM did not dissolve or liquidate after the purchase but continued to operate the metals
and ores business; and Oxyde Chemicals, B.V. operated as an independent company after purchasing OMEM's chemicals division. The district
court also found that the purchase of the chemicals division was not
fraudulent or intended to provide an escape from liability because, at the
time of the 1985 purchase, "[t]here was no knowledge of any potential
CERCLA liability," 91 and no evidence had been offered of fraudulent or
improper motive. Finally, the district court found that Oxyde Chemicals,
B.V. was not a mere continuation of OMEM because after the purchase
and sale of the chemicals division, the two corporations continued to exist
with different owners, different directors, and different corporate
shares. 92 Further, the two corporations engaged in different businesses
93
after the purchase and sale.
Similarly, the district court determined that the Oxyde defendants
could not be considered successors under the continuity of enterprise theory.94 The district court reasoned that "given the clear separation of the
chemicals and metals division at OMEM ... [and] the overwhelming fact
that the metals and ores trading division continued as a separate and independent entity for 15 years after the sale of the chemicals division," the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the Oxyde defendants were successors to the metals and ores division. 95 The Oxyde defendants did not
retain any of the metals and ores personnel, obtain assets of the metals
and ores division, produce the same product, or hold themselves out as a
continuation of the metals and ores business. While the Oxyde defendants did purchase the right to use part of OMEM's name, that alone is
insufficient to establish liability. 96 Because the district court found that
the Oxyde defendants could not be considered successors to OMEM
under the general common-law test or the continuity of enterprise test,
the court held the Oxyde defendants were not liable as successors under
CERCLA and, accordingly, granted the Oxyde defendants' motion for
97
summary judgment.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *4-5.
92. Id. at *5.

93. Id.
94. Id. at *6.

95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
97. Id. at *7.
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E.

USEFUL PRODUCT DEFENSE TO LIABILITY UNDER

1001

CERCLA

The second Southern District case involving the tin-smelter site addressed the useful-product defense to arranger liability under CERCLA. 9 8 The plaintiffs sought contribution from Bayer USA, Inc.
("Bayer"), alleging that Bayer's predecessor arranged for the disposal or
treatment of hydrochloric acid and nitric acid at the tin-smelter site.
Bayer moved for partial summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the
sales of hydrochloric acid and nitric acid to the operators of the tin
smelter were sales of a useful product and not arrangement for disposal
of a waste. The district court analyzed whether Bayer was an arranger
and Bayer's useful-product defense. 99
Neither CERCLA nor the Fifth Circuit has provided a clear definition
or test for arranger liability. 100 The determination is case specific and
ultimately turns on "whether a sufficient nexus exists between the responsible party and the disposal of the hazardous substance."' 1 Like arranger liability, the useful-product defense has not been precisely
articulated by the Fifth Circuit and the availability of the defense is a factspecific inquiry.10 2 When a "product is deemed to be waste and of no
further use to the seller and when it can be shown that the seller's motivation was to get rid of the product.

.

." the useful-product defense will not

be applicable, even if the buyer pays for and uses the product. 10 3
Taking the hydrochloric acid first, the district court determined that
Bayer was not an arranger under CERCLA. 1°4 The district court stated
that, in the Fifth Circuit, an arranger must have the obligation to exercise
control over waste disposal, not simply the ability or opportunity to control disposal. In the present case, no evidence demonstrated that Bayer
had the ability or opportunity to control the disposition of the hydrochloric acid at the tin-smelter site, let alone the obligation to do so. Accordingly the Court found that Bayer lacked the required nexus with control
over the substance to be liable as an arranger under CERCLA.10 5
The district court also examined two other factors considered by other
courts within the Fifth Circuit: 1) ownership of the product and 2) the
intent of the parties.10 6 Examining ownership, the district court noted
that title to the acid passed to the operators of the tin-smelter site well
before the acid reached the site. 10 7 Regarding intent, the district court
pointed out that no evidence demonstrated that Bayer had any knowledge of how the hydrochloric acid would be used at the tin-smelter site,
98. Tex Tin Corp. v. United
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2006).

99. Id. at *1-2.
100. Id. at *4.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *5.

103. Id.

104. Id. at *7.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.

States, Nos. G-96-247, G-96-272, 2006 WL 2546395, at *2
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and, thus, no evidence demonstrated that Bayer intended to dispose of
the acid as waste. 10 8 Without any evidence, the district court refused to
infer such an intent, and,10 9accordingly, did not find any intent showing
Bayer to be an arranger.
Finally, the district court examined whether the hydrochloric acid
shipped to the site was a useful product or waste.11 0 Bayer produced the
hydrochloric acid as part of an integrated chemical plant and used it in
other plant processes or sold it to outside customers. Bayer's sales were
to a variety of customers and for a range of prices. Further, the operators
of the tin-smelter site used the hydrochloric acid that it purchased for ore
reduction and ferric chloride production. The district court reasoned that
a market existed for the acid and that it was purchased for use in manufacturing processes. Without any evidence showing the acid to be a waste
or that Bayer was attempting to dispose of the acid, the district court
concluded that the sales of hydrochloric acid were sales of a useful
product."l '
With respect to the nitric acid, because it was a purposefully manufactured product and absent any evidence to the contrary, the district court
found the sales of nitric acid to be of a useful product.1 1 2 Because the
sales of hydrochloric acid and nitric acid constituted sales of a useful
product, and because Bayer did not qualify as an arranger under CERCLA, the district court granted Bayer's motion for partial summary
3
judgment.1t
IV.

A.

CLEAN WATER ACT CASES

CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION BATTLES CONTINUE

In United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.,1 1 4 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas attempted to clear up confusion
over the extent of the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). To
understand the case, it is necessary to briefly review the evolution of Supreme Court case law on the issue. In United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 11 5 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Army
Corps of Engineers (the "Corps") construction of "waters of the United
States" to include adjacent "freshwater wetlands" was consistent with its
authority under the CWA. 116 In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), 117 SWANCC challenged a Corps regulation that applied the CWA to any interstate waters
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
474 U.S. 121 (1985).
Id. at 121-40.
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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that "are or would be used as habitat" by migratory birds.' ' 8 The specific
issue in SWANCC was the court jurisdiction over an abandoned sand and
gravel pit that was not adjacent to a traditional navigable water.' 19 In a
five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that "nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters" were not included as "waters of the United
120
States" under the CWA.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2003 issued an opinion in In re
Needham,'2 ' that discussed SWANCC in dicta. The Needham court identified the relevance of a waterway being either navigable in fact or adjacent to a navigable body of water.12 2 The court went on to state that "in
this circuit the United States may not simply impose regulations over
puddles, sewers, roadside ditches and the like; under SWANCC 'a body
of water is subject to regulation if the body of water is actually navigable
123
or adjacent to an open body of navigable water."
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of "waters of the United
States" this year in Rapanos v. United States.1 24 In Rapanos, the government brought a civil enforcement proceeding against a developer who
had backfilled, without a permit, three Michigan wetlands lying near
ditches that eventually emptied into traditional navigable waters. 25 The
district court found federal jurisdiction over the wetlands because they
were adjacent to waters of the United States. 126 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on the hydrologic connections to the nearby ditches or the
more remote navigable waters. 127 The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth
128
Circuit's opinion and remanded the case.
Unfortunately, Rapanos, a five-to-four plurality decision, does not provide clear guidance to lower courts or regulated entities as to the scope of
the CWA. Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, wrote that intermittent and ephemeral
streams are not covered by the CWA. 129 Thus, the Corps' regulatory definition of "waters of the United States" was not a permissible construction of the statute.1 30 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion that
proposed an ambiguous test of whether a "significant nexus" exists as to
waters that are, were, or may become navigable.1 31 Justice Kennedy,
however, provided little guidance as to how the "significant nexus" test
should be applied in practice.
118. Id. at 163-64.
119. Id. at 162.
120. Id. at 167, 170-71.
121. 354 F.3d. 340 (5th Cir. 2003).

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 345.
Id. at 345-46 (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170-71.).
126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
Id. at 2214.
Id. at 2219.

127.

Id.

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 2235.
Id. at 2220-24.
Id.
Id. at 2236-52.

SMU LAW REVIEW

1004

[Vol. 60

Because of the lack of clarity from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have struggled with interpreting the implications of Rapanos. In United
States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 132 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas considered whether a discharge of oil into
an ephemeral creek was a violation of the CWA and the Oil Pollution
Act. The Chevron Pipe Line court noted the lack of guidance that Rapanos provided and stated, "Without any clear direction on determining a
significant nexus [the Kennedy test], this Court will do exactly as Chief
Justice Roberts declared-'feel [its] way on a case-by-case basis."' 133 The
district court then indicated that it would apply the prior reasoning that
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals announced in Needham in determining
whether there was a "significant nexus" between the ephemeral creek
and navigable waters: "[A]s a matter of law in this circuit, the connection
of generally dry channels and creek beds will not suffice to create a 'significant nexus' to a navigable water simply because one feeds into the
next during the rare times of actual flow."1134 The court went on to hold,
that ephemeral channels did
quoting Justice Scalia's opinion in Rapanos,135
not fall within the jurisdiction of the CWA.
B.

CALCULATING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION

OF MONTHLY AVERAGES

In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chemical Co., 136 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reviewed the penalty calculation under section 309(d) of the CWA. The district court had
previously found that Chevron violated the total suspended solids limitations in its NPDES permit sixty-five times. 137 Of the violations, twentytwo involved monthly average TSS violations. 138 The issue before the
court was whether the civil penalty for monthly average violations should
be counted as a single violation or as a violation occurring each day of the
139
month.
The district court quoted the language of the CWA that provides that a
person who violates the statute "shall be subject to a civil penalty not to
exceed $25,000 per day for each violation. 1 40 The district court went on
to adopt the position that the Fourth Circuit announced in Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,14 1 that the words
"per day" and "per violation" strongly suggest that if "a violation is defined in terms of a time period longer than a day, the maximum penalty
assessable for that violation should be defined in terms of the number of
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.
Nos. 1:94-CV-434, 1:94-CV-580, 2006 WL 887459, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2007)).
791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
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days in that time period."' 142 The district court further noted that this
approach was consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA's") penalty policy. 1 43 Accordingly, the Court held that "the statutory maximum penalty for a monthly average violation should be calculated by multiplying the statutory amount by the total number of days in
144
the month in which the violation occurred."'
The district court acknowledged that the daily approach may result in
high penalties but indicated that a reviewing court could consider the reasons why a monthly average was violated and reduce the amount of the
penalty based on the particular circumstances of the case. 14 5 Thus, the
court has the necessary discretion to assess higher penalties for a polluter
engaging in high discharges on a daily basis than a polluter who violates
146
the monthly limitation because of a single discharge.
C.

CITIZENS' SUITS

In a case involving the question of standing to bring a citizen's suit
under the CWA, the plaintiff in Downstream Environmental, L.L.C. v.
Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Auth. 14 7 owned and operated a facility that
disposed of grease and grit-trap wastes generated primarily by restaurants. State law requires that such wastes be disposed of at a facility holding an MSW Type V permit issued by the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality ("TCEQ"). 148 Downstream alleged that a competitor, U.S. Oil Recovery, L.L.P. ("USOR"), was disposing of grease
and grit-trap without the requisite permit. Downstream asserted a number of claims against USOR and the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority, including a claim under the CWA's citizen-suit provision.
Downstream's primary contention was that, by avoiding CWA permitting
requirements, USOR was able to charge lower prices to its customers,
14 9
thus harming Downstream.
USOR moved to dismiss Downstream's claims. With respect to the
CWA claim, the district court stated that Downstream failed to "allege or
identify an aesthetic, recreational, economic, or other legally protected
interest in any particular waterway it claimed was affected by USOR's
improper discharge and dumping activities. ' 150 Rather, the district court
decreed that Downstream had alleged only economic injury caused by a
competitive disadvantage. 1 51 The district court held that Downstream's
alleged injuries were not sufficient to confer standing in a CWA citizen's
142. Chevron Chem. Co., 2006 WL 887459, at *2 (quoting Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
791 F.2d at 314).
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. No. H-05-1865, 2006 WL 1875959 (S.D. Tex. July 5, 2006).
148. Id. at *1.
149. Id. at *9.

150. Id. at *10.
151. Id.
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suit. 152 Specifically, the district court held that Downstream's allegations
were not distinguishable from the generalized grievances of the public
and that the claimed injuries were not fairly traceable to the improper
USOR. 153 Consequently, the district court dismissed the
discharge by 154
CWA claims.
In two other related cases involving a citizen's suit brought under the
CWA, the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and
civil penalties against a defendant developer for failing to adequately
control stormwater runoff. 155 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the
developer's actions resulted in the degradation of water quality and the
accumulation of sediment and debris in nearby ponds.
The developer asserted a third-party contribution action against several
other parties, including a lawn-care company and two private persons.
The developer claimed that inadequate erosion controls by the thirdparty defendants contributed to the sedimentation of the ponds. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted
the third-party defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the developer
exists for claims asserted
failed to establish that a right of contribution
156
under the CWA or federal common law.
The district court did indicate, however, that in determining the
amount of civil penalties to be assessed, the CWA permits the consideration of any matter "'as justice may require,' including any facts that may
show" that the third-party defendants were responsible for some of the
plaintiff's claimed damages. 157 Thus, while the CWA does not allow for a
caused by third parties
right to contribution, the proportion of damages
158
may be considered in assessing a civil penalty.
In another citizen's suit case, a Texas resident filed a claim under the
CWA against the director of the Texas Department of Transportation
("TxDOT") for alleged violations of the Texas Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("TPDES") program. 159 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed
that TxDOT had to implement a compliant stormwater-pollution-prevention plan ("SWP3") for a road-widening project in violation of its TPDES
160
general permit.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that
the SWP3 complied with the requirements of the General Permit because
it discussed temporary erosion, sediment, and pollution-control measures
152. Id.
153. Id. at *10-11.
154. Id. at *12.
155. Envt'l Conservation Org. v. Bagwell, No. 4:03-CV-807-Y, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21669, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2005); Envt'l Conservation Org. v. Bagwell, No. 4:03-CV807-Y, 2005 WL 2465003, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2005).
156. Bagwell, 2005 WL 2465003, at *1.
157. Id. at *34.
158. Id.

159. Hill v. Behrens, No. H-04-CV-3601, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29188, at *2-4 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 31, 2005).

160. Id. at *5-8.
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to be implemented; stabilization of the soil; construction of and maintenance procedures for erosion-control structures; and approval by the project engineer when completed. 16 1 The district court noted that the SWP3
omitted inspection reports, but it held that this omission was de minimis
because there was sufficient evidence of inspections and notification of
compliance.162
Further, the district court held that the alleged violations were wholly
past and could not serve as the basis for a citizen's suit under the
CWA. 163 Finally, the district court reasoned that, because the plaintiff
for future damages, the suit was not yet ripe for
was seeking 1relief
64
adjudication.
V.

CRIMINAL CODE PROVISION AND COMMUNICATIONS
WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES

Most people do not pay much attention to the potential impact of a
provision of the federal Criminal Code that was created to address false
statements in the context of government proceedings. Codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1001, the provision contains the following short language:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative or judicial branch
of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictiunder this title
tious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined
165
or, imprisoned not more than 5 years,... or both.
What relevance does this have for environmental practitioners and their
clients? The answer is that government agencies and United States attorneys have been using this provision to prosecute companies or their employees for allegedly making false statements in the context of
investigations of potential violations of federal environmental statutes.
The government has been taking the position that this provision is very
broad and extends not only to actual and direct false statements but also
to creating a false impression or failing to fully divulge facts in a discussion, writing, or statement to the investigating official. In our experience,
governmental investigators appear very knowledgeable of this provision
and use it quite aggressively, accusing parties during the investigation
before any decision about prosecution has been made.
While certain federal environmental statutes contained provisions for
prosecution for false statements, Section 1001 may be advantageous to
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at *18-19.
Id. at *19-20.
Id. at *20-21.
Id. at *22-23.
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2007).
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government officials or attorneys because it is broader than the provisions contained in environmental statutes.
The government's knowledge and use of this provision raises concerns
for corporate environmental staff and individual business people. When
contacted by government officials or investigators, individuals should
take caution in how they respond to these inquiries. The adage that the
cover up may be worse than the crime certainly may apply. When a federal environmental investigation begins, training of staff and receiving of
advice by attorneys may help avoid potential claims of false statements
and prosecution under Section 1001 and similar provisions under federal
environmental statutes. Advising employers as to communications with
federal agencies-in this case, those with any form of environmental jurisdiction, such as the EPA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Agency, the Materials Management Service, or the Coast Guard-appears to be a wise
investment of time and training.
A.
1.

CASES

Section 1001 Case

Several cases in Texas during the Survey period involved criminal prosecution of individuals under this provision.
The first case we reviewed, United States v. Riecke,166 addressed the
issue of whether the government could prosecute Riecke under Section
1001 despite the Clean Air Act's similar provision. The defense attorney
argued that since the Clean Air Act contained a provision specifically
governing false statements, Reicke could not be prosecuted under the
167
general provision.
In considering this challenge, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas made two points. First, the district court considered the concept of lenity and the conclusions of other courts in this
area. 168 Citing a United States Supreme Court ruling on the issue of lenity,169 the district court concluded that the rule is designed to guide an

interpreting court in resolving ambiguity but cannot serve to create ambiguity.170 The district court was also guided by a Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in another Clean Air Act case involving alleged false
statements. 171 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the provisions in the two
statutes did not create any ambiguity, and it permitted prosecution under
Section 1001.172
166.
167.
168.
169.

No. 3:06-CR-109-G, 2006 WL 2381595 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2006).
Id.
Id. at *2.
See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961).

170. Riecke, 2006 WL 2381595, at *2.

171. Id. at *2 (reviewing United States v. Shaw, 150 F. App'x 863, 864 (10th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2039 (May 15, 2006)).
172. Shaw, 150 F. App'x at 874 n.25.

2007]

Environmental Law

1009

The second point that the district court made was that the prosecutor
may choose under which criminal provision to prosecute a particular defendant if the defendant may have violated more than one statutory provision-absent evidence of Congressional intent to the contrary. 173 The
district court again cited the Tenth Circuit decision construing Section
1001 and Section 7413(c)( 2)( A) of the Clean Air Act, which ruled that
Congress. never indicated in any legislative history that the false-statement provision would apply in lieu of any other provision in the United
States Code prohibiting false statements to federal officials. 174 Moreover, the district court ruled that the defendant had failed to provide any
175
evidence whatsoever of such intent.
2.

Employees May File Wrongful Discharge Claims Accusing
Employers of Attempting to Force Them to Make False
Statements

An issue related to advising employees on communications with federal agencies is the potential for employees to file suit when they contend
that the company attempted to coerce them into making false statements
or submitting false reports or documents to the federal agency.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reviewed a summary-judgment motion by a company that had been sued by
a former environmental manager who claimed wrongful termination as a
result of his refusal to submit allegedly fraudulent reports to the EPA. In
Graham v. Louisiana Pacific Corp.,176 the plaintiff alleged that the com-

pany defendant had conspired to conceal violations of the federal Clean
Air Act and other environmental laws.
According to the employee's affidavit, the federal government had previously sued the company for violations of the Clean Air Act. The company entered into a consent decree with the government that was entered
by the federal district court. The consent decree required that the company perform certain tasks and refrain from engaging in certain activities
to ensure that no reprisal or retaliation was carried out against any employee who reports actual or potential violations of law, including environmental law, to any local, state, or federal regulatory authority. While
the consent decree was in force, the company was barred from federal
77
contracts. 1
The employee further alleged that, in an effort to terminate the consent
decree early, the company made material false statements to the federal
government and to the federal court, many of which involved the plant
where the employee had worked as the plant environmental manager.
173.
123-24
174.
175.

Riecke, 2006 WL 2381595, at *2 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
(1979)).
Rieke, 2006 WL 2381595, at *2 (citing Shaw, 150 F. App'x at 874).
Riecke, 2006 WL 2381595, at *2.

176. No. 1:04-CV-650, 2006 WL 435711 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2006).

177. Graham v. La. Pac. Corp., Pl's Resp. to Def's Mot. for Summ. J., No. 1:04-CV0650, 2006 WL 813714, at *6-7 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2006).
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As a result, the employee claimed, the consent decree was terminated
early, and shortly thereafter, the EPA lifted the bar against the company
17 8
receiving federal government contracts.
The district court reviewed the company's summary-judgment motion.
The first issue was whether the former employee has any right to a
wrongful-termination claim. 179 In Texas, the law allows employees en18 0
gaged for an indefinite time period to be terminated without cause.
The district court, however, cited the Sabine Pilot18l exception to the termination of at-will employment, which provides that an employee may
bring a wrongful-termination action if the sole reason for termination is
refusal to perform and illegal act.1 82 The employee's resignation letter
filed did not waive this cause of action. 183 If an employee can prove that
he resigned because he refused to commit an illegal act, he can effectively
show constructive discharge. 184 To prove constructive discharge, the employee must demonstrate that his employer has made the employment so
185
intolerable that the employee feels compelled to resign.
The district court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment
because the former employee submitted an affidavit in which he alleged
he was about to be fired and that he resigned in order to preserve his
ability to seek employment elsewhere.1 86 The affidavit further alleged
the circumstances in which he claimed that he was being asked to participate in a cover up of the facts and violations that would have led to a
potential criminal violation of the federal Clean Air Act.
The company alleged that his affidavit contained reasons other than
the alleged criminal conduct that caused him to resign and that this was
not the sole reason for his resignation. The district court ruled that all of
these facts and their inferences were better left to trial and that no sum187
mary judgment could be issued.
In considering the potential criminal acts, the district court reviewed
Section 7401 and Section 7413(c) of the Clean Air Act, which sets out
criminal penalties for violations of the Act. 188 The district court concluded that the pleadings of the plaintiff, if true, would show that he was
pressured to abet corporation's criminal activity that could result in his
own criminal liability under the Clean Air Act. 189 At least two Texas
cases have held that this is sufficient to meet the Sabine Pilot exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine and the ability to terminate employees
178. Id. at *8.
179. Graham, 2006 WL 435711, at *2-3.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985).
Graham, 2006 WL 435711, at *2-3.
Id.
Id.
Id.

186. Id. at *3.
187. Id. at *4.
188. Id.

189. Id.
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without cause. 190
VI. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF TEXAS WATER CODE

PROVISION AGAINST "ALLOWING" POLLUTION TO OCCUR

Vagueness challenges are not uncommon in challenges to criminal
prosecutions under environmental statutes. These statutes are frequently
drafted broadly, and the meaning of words or the applications of the
prohibitions or requirements may often create an opening for challenging
the lack of specificity in the act. During the Survey period, Valero Refining-Texas L.P. ("Valero") challenged a section of the Texas Water Code
that prohibited a person from "allowing" a discharge of any waste or pollutant into any water in the state. 191
The first challenge was to the Water Code provisions because they
criminalized an act without identifying to whom the duty applied. 192 The
court considered United States Supreme Court precedent as to the
vagueness and the issue of awareness of the criminal conduct. The court
cited United States v. Park'93 in particular and considered that the environmental statutes, like the Texas Water Code, are strict-liability statutes,
which do not require that the defendant be aware that his conduct is a
criminal act. 194 The court stated that for certain types of actions, the federal and state legislators eliminated the requirement of a culpable mental
state.1 95 The court concluded that, based on federal and state precedent,
for a strict-liability regulatory statute, the mere omission or failure to act
is sufficient to convict a responsible corporate agent or the corporation.1 9 6 The court said that the ability to prevent the act was sufficient
and the Texas legislature's use of the term "allow" incorporated this "responsible-relationship concept" into the relevant provision of the Texas
1 97
Water Code.
The court then turned to the meaning of the term "allow." Since that
statute did not define it, the court reviewed the plain meaning-"to neg190. Morales v. Simuflite Training Int'l, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 603, 608-09 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2004, no pet.); Higgenbotham v. Allwaste, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
191. Valero Ref.-Tex. L.P. v. Texas, 203 S.W.3d 556, 558 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
192. Id. at 560-61. Valero relied upon the Court of Criminal Appeals decision in which
the court deemed vague a statute that required parties to obtain medical help to people
over the age of sixty-five, since the people to whom the provision would apply was not
clear, but appeared to apply to everyone. Billingslea v. State, 780 S.W.2d 271, 275-76 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989).
193. 421 U.S. 658, 668 (1975); see also Am. Plant Food Corp. v. State, 587 S.W.2d 679,
684-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (noting the strict-liability of the water-pollution provisions).
194. Valero, 203 S.W.3d at 561.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Park, 421 U.S. at 671; U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943)).
197. Id.
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lect to restrain or prevent."'1 98 Relying on Supreme Court precedent in
interpreting these types of statutes, these terms were interpreted to require that the person have control over what is being allowed; thus the
court construed Section 7.147 of the Texas Water Code to impose a duty
on persons who have the ability to control the discharge of pollutants. 199
Moreover, the court ruled that this provision requires responsible persons
"to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, [they have] a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur. '200 Finally, the court ruled that the defendant could
not show that it was outside the group of persons that the statute was
201
designed to reach.
VII.

CONCLUSION

We hope the review of the cases in the courts or involving individuals
or entities in Texas has demonstrated what was suggested in the Introduction, that the issues are rich and diverse in the Texas environmental-law
field. In reviewing these cases, it is important to consider these Constitutional issues these cases raise. As has been the case over the last several
decades, many of the most interesting constitutional questions ariseparticularly relating to the Commerce Clause-in environmental cases.
The extent to which the federal government may regulate wetlands or
rivers and streams under the Clean Water Act impacts not only waterpollution prevention and preservation of natural water bodies but also
extends to the federal government powers in general.
The debate over the extent of an individual's or entity's private right of
action to recover hazardous-waste-clean-up costs raises questions of how
courts will interpret other private contribution rights under other statutes. The public-policy issues of whether private parties will be encouraged to take action to address a public concern without first having
the government issue an administrative order or commence a lawsuit lie
at the heart of the debate of CERCLA cost-recovery actions.
The debate over the ability to release claims and avoid future fraud
claims in as-is clauses and the environmental liabilities that go undiscovered by land buyers, addresses public-policy issues in the center of commercial transactions. The concerns of enforcing privately negotiated
contracts and the government's and court's responsibility to police and
prevent fraud in commercial activities compete; and the degree to which
such opposing objectives win out serves as yet another example of when
environmental matters or liabilities drive business decisions, valuation of
certain assets and companies, and the legal rules that govern commercial
behavior and contracts.

198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 562.
Id.
Id. (quoting Park, 421 U.S. at 672-73).
Id. at 563.

